Decision under uncertainty : moment of discovery for new scientific hypothesis

Abstract

In this thesis we will be exploring the full extent of Peirce’s Pragmaticism. Differentiating from his former Pragmatism, which contemporary scholars uttered for a more psychological view rather than one combined with a logical perspective of phenomena, we will be confronted whether such methodology is sufficient in today’s standards of psychosomatic epistemological limits. After which, will decree what type of framework we could visualize chance or probability, as a main characteristic of the whole, in matter and human degree of belief. Finally, if successful in introducing the full implication of the principles of Peirce’s Pragmaticism, we could eventually start to re-vision any type of human-framed knowledge, to the point of achieving greater expansion in our range of propositions. In this way, human inquiry is condemned by its own generating force towards creation, in any of its forms.